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We use agent-based modeling to investigate the effect of conservatism and partisanship on the
efficiency with which large populations solve the density classification task—a paradigmatic problem
for information aggregation and consensus building. We find that conservative agents enhance the
populations’ ability to efficiently solve the density classification task despite large levels of noise
in the system. In contrast, we find that the presence of even a small fraction of partisans holding
the minority position will result in deadlock or a consensus on an incorrect answer. Our results
provide a possible explanation for the emergence of conservatism and suggest that even low levels
of partisanship can lead to significant social costs.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems, 89.75.-k Complex systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Many practical and scientific problems require the col-
laboration of groups of experts, with different expertise
and background. Remarkably, it turns out that large
groups of cooperative agents are extremely adept at find-
ing efficient strategies for solving such problems [1, 2]; the
development of the scientific method within the physical
science or the development of entire suites of computer
software by the open source movement [3] being per-
haps two of the most notable instances [4]. Indeed, even
loosely structured groups have demonstrated an ability
to coordinate and find innovative solutions to complex
problems.
In the corporate world, several companies—including
IBM, HP and various consulting companies—have used
“the wisdom of the crowd” principle as the justification
for the creation of knowledge communities, the so-called
“Communities of Practice,” which have enabled organi-
zations to spawn new ideas for products and services [5].
Other companies, such as Intel, Eli Lilly, and Procter &
Gamble, which created company-sponsored closed knowl-
edge networks, are now opening them to outsiders [6].
Recognizing that knowledge exists not merely in
the members of the network but in the networks
themselves—that is, in the members and in their
interactions—naturally leads to the question of what
characterizes successful communities and what measures
could be taken to improve the ability of groups and
organizations to innovate. Previous work investigated
the importance of group diversity [7, 8], team for-
mation [9], and the structure of the interaction net-
work [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Here, we focus instead on
the effect of micro-level strategies on macro-level perfor-
mance.
Recent work demonstrates that under quite gen-
eral conditions, well-intentioned and completely trusting
agents can efficiently solve information aggregation and
coordination tasks [11]. We investigate how changes in
the intention and trust level of agents affects the effi-
ciency of solving such tasks by considering three types of
agents: naives, conservatives and partisans. Naive agents
are well-intentioned and completely trusting. Conserva-
tive agents are well-intentioned but not completely trust-
ing. Partisan agents are neither well-intentioned nor
completely trusting.
Remarkably, we find that conservative agents, despite
slowing the information aggregation and coordination
process, actually enhance the populations’ ability to ef-
ficiently solve these tasks under large levels of noise. In
contrast, we find that even a small fraction of partisans
holding the minority position will result in deadlock or a
consensus on an incorrect answer. Significantly, only by
completely disregarding partisan opinions, can the pop-
ulation recover its original ability to solve the task.
II. THE MODEL
We use here the density classification task, a model of
decentralized collective problem-solving [15], to quanti-
tatively investigate information aggregation and coordi-
nation. The density classification task is completed suc-
cessfully if (i) all agents converge to the same state within
a determined time period, and (ii) that consensual state
was the majority state in the initial configuration.
Before proceeding, let us explain the reasons why the
density classification task is a good paradigm for the
type of problems into which we aim to gain insight.
Consider a population of agents tackling a problem in
which there is a large uncertainty and for which no agent
will be able, by herself, to demonstrate that a particular
2solution is correct. If one assumes that all agents are
well-intentioned, that is, that they want to find a good
solution to the problem, then it is plausible to assume
that the answer reached by a specific agent “contains”
a good answer distorted by some noise. Under these
conditions, an efficient strategy is to aggregate the
answers from all agents, as information aggregation
cancels the distorting component of the individual
answers. However, in many situations a centralized
structure may not be practical or desirable because
it is too inefficient, too costly, or because it would be
difficult to secure an unbiased central authority. For
these reasons, decentralized strategies may be preferable
or even the only ones feasible.
A. The Agents
We consider a population of N agents. For simplic-
ity, and without loss of generality. The state of each
agent is a binary variable aj ∈ {−1, 1} that represents
the answer to a stated problem. Updating occurs us-
ing Boolean functions. As we indicated earlier, agents
can hold various types of intentions. Specifically, well-
intentioned agents have a bias bj toward their present
state bj = aj(t), while “partisan” agents have a bias to-
ward a particular state, for example, bj = −1. Naive and
conservative agents are thus not biased for or against ei-
ther state per se, they merely prefer whatever answer
they currently hold. While all three types of agents may
change their state in response to peer pressure, a parti-
san agent will defect back to his preferred state if peer
pressure decreases below a threshold value.
Both conservative and partisan agents can have differ-
ent levels of trust on their neighbors, that is, different
thresholds for responding to peer pressure. We define
the “strength” sj ∈ [0, 1] of agent j’s “conviction” as the
threshold that must be exceed by ∆j(t)—which is the
difference between the fraction of majority and minor-
ity positions among agent j’s neighbors—for agent j to
change states. If sj = 0, then the agent is completely
trusting, that is, naive, whereas if sj = 1, the agent is
completely distrusting and thus will never change his an-
swer (Fig. 1).
Formally, one can write the update rule for agents with
naive, conservative, or partisan strategies as:
aj(t+ 1) =


+1 ∆j(t) > −bjsj
aj(t) ∆j(t) = −bjsj ,
−1 ∆j(t) < −bjsj
(1)
where ∆j(t) is defined as:
∆j(t) =
1
1 + kj

aj(t) + kj∑
l=1
a˜jl (t)

 . (2)
Here, kj is the number of neighbors of agent j and a˜
j
l (t)
is the perceived state of neighbor l by agent j at time
t, which may differ from al(t) due to noise [11]. We im-
plement the effect of noise by picking with probability
η a value for a˜jl (t) that is drawn with equal probability
from {−1, 1}. If η = 0, then a˜jl (t) = al(t), whereas for
η = 1, a˜jl (t) is a random variable. Figure 1 illustrates the
response of each type of agent to different signals.
The model we study is, on the surface, quite similar
to the voter model which has been widely used to study
social dynamics and opinion formation [10, 12, 14]. A sig-
nificant difference, however, is that whereas in the voter
model the agent picks a single neighbor at random and
adopts its neighbor’s state, the model we use is more
similar to that of an Ising model with zero temperature
Glauber dynamics, in which at each step the agent tries
to align with some local field exerted by the neighbors
and herself. This subtle difference leads the two models
to quite distinct dynamics.
Tessone and Toral [16] have recently studied opinion
formation in a model in which agents are have prefer-
ence toward a specific opinion with a variety of strengths.
Each agent follows the simple majority of their neighbors
to update her state taking into account its bias. The au-
thors find that the system responds more efficiently to
external forcing if the agents are diverse, that is each
agent has a different bias strength. In here, however, we
focus on the effect of opinion-bias on consensus formation
without external forcing.
B. Network Topology
A large body of literature demonstrates that social net-
works have complex topologies [17], and yet have com-
mon features [18, 19]. We build a network following the
model proposed by Watts and Strogatz [20, 21], which,
despite its simplicity, captures two important properties
of social networks: local cliquishness and the small-world
property. We implement the Watts and Strogatz model
as follows. First, we create an ordered network by placing
the agents on the nodes of a one-dimensional lattice with
periodic boundary conditions. Then, we connect each
agent to its k nearest neighbors in the lattice. Next, with
probability p, we rewire each of the links in the network
by redirecting a link to a randomly selected agent in the
lattice. By varying the value of p, the network topology
changes from the ordered one-dimensional lattice (p = 0)
to a random graph (p = 1). We verified that our results
are robust to changes in p as long as the network has
a small-world topology, which for N = 401 occurs for
p ≥ 0.1 (Supporting Online Material). In this study,
we investigate populations of N = 401 agents placed
on a one-dimensional ring lattice where each agent has
k = 6 neighbors. To implement a small-world topology
we rewire each connection with probability p = 0.15. Re-
cent research demonstrates that, under these conditions,
the naive heuristic enables the efficient convergence of
the system to the correct consensus [11, 22]. This find-
ing is similar to what has been reported for the voter
3model. Specifically, studies of the voter model on com-
plex topologies have shown that finite systems conver-
gence faster to a consensus in small-world networks than
in regular lattices in one dimension and that this effect
is independent of the degree distribution [10, 12, 14].
III. RESULTS
A. Effect of conservatism
We first consider the effect of conservative agents on
the efficiency of the system. Let’s assume that the system
has both naive and conservative agents present, and that
the fraction of agents using conservative strategies is fc.
The characteristics of the population are then described
by the distribution
P (bj , sj) = δbj ,aj(t) Ps(sj) . (3)
For simplicity, we set sj = s > 0 for the conservative
agents and sj = 0 for the naive agents. Thus,
Ps(sj) = (1 − fc) δ(sj − 0) + fc δ(sj − s). (4)
We study three values for the bias strength: s = 2/7,
4/7, and 6/7 (Fig. 2A). For s = 2/7 and s = 4/7, the
system completes the density classification task with ex-
traordinary efficiency. Indeed, increasing fc results in
greater efficiencies for high noise levels, which can be ex-
plained if one considers the stabilizing effect of conserva-
tive agents on the dynamics.
In order to further characterize the effect of conserva-
tive agents on the system’s efficiency, we next investigate
how the time needed for the system to reach the steady
state depends on fc (Fig. 3 and Supporting Online Ma-
terial). We find that the “convergence time” grows quite
rapidly with the fraction of conservatives in the system.
In particular, for fc > 0.3 the system can no longer reach
the steady state within 2N time steps.
These two findings suggest that a population of agents
trying to optimize strategies in order to reach maximum
efficiency must balance the greater accuracy of the sys-
tem in completing the task for larger noise levels afforded
by larger fractions of conservative agents with the rapidly
increasing convergence time as fc increases.
B. Effect of partisanship
We next consider the effect of partisan agents on the
efficiency of the system. Let’s assume that the system
now has both naive and partisan agents present, and
that the fraction of agents using partisan strategies is
fp. Because partisan agents can have bias toward two
distinct answers, we consider two scenarios. In the first
scenario, all partisan agents have a bias toward “−1”,
that is, they prefer the incorrect answer to the density
classification task the population is trying to complete
[37]. If sj = s > 0, then the characteristics of the popu-
lation in this scenario are described by the distribution
P (bj, sj) = (1− fp)δ(sj − 0)δbj ,aj(t) + fpδ(sj − s)δbj ,−1 .
(5)
We again study three values for the bias strength: s =
2/7, 4/7, and 6/7. Our results reveal that even when
partisan agents have a small bias strength s = 2/7,
and, therefore, yield to peer pressure easily, fp ≥ 0.15
is enough to overcome the initial majority and lead the
population to converge to the incorrect answer (Fig. 2B).
In the second scenario, we consider a balanced distri-
bution of partisans with fp/2 agents partisan toward an-
swer “1” and fp/2 agents partisan toward answer “−1”
(Fig. 2C). For η < 0.4 and fp < 0.3, we find that the
strength of the initial majority is able to drive the pop-
ulation to a consensus on the correct answer. However,
if either the noise level or the fraction of partisans in-
creases, the population settles into a deadlock. One could
naively expect that in the high bias strength case the re-
sults for partisans and conservatives should be identical.
In both systems, conservatives and partisans alike are
frozen in their preferred state. In the system with con-
servatives, the distribution of preferred states is exactly
the same as the distribution of initial states, which is
that 57% of agents prefer state “1”. However, in the sys-
tem with partisans, the distribution of preferred states
is such that 50% of the agents prefer state “1”. There-
fore, even though the distribution of initial states is 57%,
all partisans will switch to their preferred state because
of the high bias strength. As a consequence, in the re-
gions of lowest efficiency, there is a difference in efficiency
between the results for conservatives and the results for
partisans.
The effect of strongly biased partisans in opinion for-
mation, that is those partisans that never change opin-
ion, has also been studied in the context of the voter
model [23, 24] showing that only one partisan is enough
to significantly slow down consensus formation and that,
in regular lattices and complete graphs, when an equal
number of partisans P of each opinion is present, the ef-
ficiency of the system in the steady state is Gaussian dis-
tributed with zero mean and variance ∝ 1/
√
(Z). Thus
for large systems, a vanishing fraction of partisans is nec-
essary to put the system in deadlock and prevent consen-
sus from happening. Such finding is consistent with our
results. However, since we consider that partisans are
biased but can change state, our model shows that, in
the presence of noise, the population can actually reach
consensus when there are large fractions of partisans.
C. Effect of distrust
Because partisanship appears to remove a population’s
ability to reach consensus on the correct answer, we next
investigate possible ways to counter the effect of parti-
san agents. A plausible strategy for non-partisan agents
4is to “discount” the signal of partisan agents. We thus
define a discount parameter d ∈ [0, 1] with which non-
partisans weigh the information held by partisan agents.
As demonstrated by a recent study [25], we must also
enable partisan agents to discount the signals of both
non-partisan and opposing partisan agents with at least
the same discount rate.
Surprisingly, we find that the increased distrust among
agents actually has a deleterious effect on the efficiency
of the system in solving the density classification task
(Fig. 5). The reason for this apparently counter-intuitive
result is that sj = s > 0 for partisans, so that when d ≤
0.5, partisan agents discount the answer of non-partisan
agents to such an extent that they will never abandon
their preferred answer. In fact, only for d = 0 is a system
containing partisan agents able to efficiently complete the
density classification task.
IV. DISCUSSION
Common experience demonstrates the existence of par-
tisanship within groups of any kind. One possible inter-
pretation for partisanship is a strong a priori belief that
a certain answer is correct. Alternatively, one may con-
sider the case where agents have personal interests that
may in fact differ from the “common good.” In this case
individual decision rules, such as the degree of partisan-
ship, can be interpreted as the solution to a maximization
problem at the individual level. We model this question
by assigning to a set of rational agents an idiosyncratic
utility function that each agent tries to maximize, while
the rest of the agents use the naive strategy. The inter-
esting case is the one in which the agent’s self-interest
comes from answer “−1” being adopted while the “com-
mon good” comes from “1” being adopted. A utility
function for the rational agents is:
Uj ≡ Ij
N
−
N
+ (1− Ij)E
=
(
1−
3Ij
2
)
E +
Ij
2
, (6)
where Ij is the degree to which the agent values his own
“self-interest over the common good.” If I > 2/3, the
agent’s utility is maximized by minimizing E. Thus, if
an agent has I > 2/3 the optimal individual strategy is
partisanship with s = 1. If I ≤ 2/3, then the optimal
strategy depends on the strength of the noise (Fig. 4);
the stronger the noise, the more conservative the agents
should be.
These findings thus provide a possible explanation for
the emergence of conservatism and partisanship as mech-
anisms to maximize individual rather than collective ad-
vantage. The question then arises of how one can rec-
oncile the advantage of self-interest with the evolution
toward cooperative societies. The answer is that for indi-
vidual decisions to serve common good, societies must de-
velop and adopt norms that regulate self-interest [26, 27].
Importantly, only in the presence of norms and the
“metanorms” that support their enforcement [26], will
individuals adopt strategies that lead toward cooperation
and better social outcomes.
Our findings for the effect of partisan agents on the
efficiency with which the system completes the density
classification task are striking. Even a small fraction of
partisans can completely erase the efficiency of the sys-
tem. It is not difficult to envision the consequences of
this result on our daily lives. Democratic societies face
many situations in which “difficult” decisions must be
made [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. Moreover, the
ability of policy makers to reach timely decisions on diffi-
cult matters clearly increases when a strategy has broad
support. Reaching such broad consensus, unfortunately,
is unlikely to occur if partisan agents are present. Sadly,
partisanship is the rational individual strategy if there
are no norms against it.
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APPENDIX: APPENDIX A
For concreteness, and without loss of generality, we as-
sign a 57% probability to state “1” in the initial configu-
ration of the system. By setting p = 0.57, we avoid finite
size effects (Supporting Online Material). We then define
the instantaneous efficiency of the coordination process
as
ε(t) ≡
N+(t)−N−(t)
N
, (A.1)
where N+ is the number of agents that are in state “1”
and N
−
is the number of agents that are in state “−1”.
For each realization, we allow the system to evolve for
2N time steps. In order to ensure that the strategies
used by the agents are scalable, we let the system evolve
for a number of time steps proportional to the number
of agents in the system N . We define the efficiency ε of
a single realization as
ε ≡
1
τ
2N∑
t=2N−τ
ε(t) (A.2)
setting τ = N/4. The efficiency E for a given set of pa-
rameter values is the average of ε over 1000 realizations.
Crutchfield and Mitchell [15] allowed the system to con-
verge to a point where all the agents have the same state,
and a realization is considered to be successful provided
5the converged state is the same as the majority state. In-
stead of requiring that the system reaches consensus, we
focus instead on the steady state configuration reached
by the system.
6FIG. 1: Illustration of the different agent strategies. The
strategy followed by an agent j is characterized by two param-
eters: bj , which indicates the agent’s bias, and sj , which quan-
tifies the strength of the bias. bj ∈ {aj(t),−1, 1}, whereas
sj ∈ [0, 1]. Well-intentioned agents (whether naive or conser-
vative) have bj = aj(t), whereas partisan agents have bj = ±1.
If sj = 0, agents are completely trusting. As sj increases, the
level of distrust increases, so that, for sj = 1, agents will freeze
once they attain their preferred state.
7FIG. 2: Efficiency of a population of distributed autonomous
agents in completing the density classification task as a func-
tion of noise intensity and: (A) the fraction of conservative
agents, (B) the fraction of partisan agents holding the mi-
nority state, and (C) the total fraction of partisan agents in
the population whose preferred states are equally distributed
between majority and minority states. We show results for
three bias strengths, s = 2/7, 4/7, and 6/7.
Our results suggest that (i) conservatism can be beneficial be-
cause it enhances the ability of the population to efficiently
solve the density classification task for grater noise levels
(panel A); (ii) partisanship can completely cancel the effi-
ciency of a population in solving the task, even if a small
fraction of partisans (fp ≥ 0.15) is present (Panel B). Panel
(C) shows how having partisans toward both answers leads to
deadlock, especially at high noise levels for which the popu-
lation as a whole will be evenly split between the two states.
8FIG. 3: Effect of conservatism on attaining the steady state.
(A) Time for a population to reach the stationary state as a
function of the fraction of conservatives. (B) Comparison of
the asymptotic efficiency (Eas), that is the efficiency in the
stationary state, and the efficiency E attained after 2N time
steps as a function of the fraction of conservatives. Note that
for fc > 0.3, the system cannot reach the stationary state in
the 2N time steps used in the simulations.
9FIG. 4: Effect of selective distrust. We consider a system
in which well-intentioned agents take partial consideration of
partisan agents’ opinions and vice-versa. The discount param-
eter d quantifies the weight a well-intentioned agent assigns
to the opinion of a partisan agent. We consider a population
with a fraction fc of conservative agents and 5% of partisan
agents, both of them with bias strength s = 2/7, and 5%
of population being partisans to the minority opinion. We
show the efficiency of the population as a function of fc and
of noise. For d > 0.5, partisans may converge to the positive
state if a qualified majority of their neighbors are already in
that state. In such case, the population can still attain a rela-
tively high efficiency for a wide range of parameter values. In
contrast, when 0 < d ≤ 0.5, partisans are unlikely to change
states even when all their neighbors are in the opposite state.
In such conditions, the small fraction of partisans acts as a
constant bias toward the negative state, resulting in a drastic
reduction of the population’s efficiency. Only for d = 0, that
is when the two groups, well-intentioned and partisan agents,
completely disregard each other does the system recover the
ability to efficiently solve the density classification task.
10
FIG. 5: Strategy evolvability. We show the utility function U
of an agent as a function of his self-interest Ij and the noise
level η, where Uj ≡ Ij
N
−
N
+(1− Ij)E
∗(η) =
(
1− 3I
2
)
E∗(η)+
I
2
. We show results for populations with a 10% of non-naive
agents (see Figs. 2A and 2B), that is, for each set of values
{Ij , η}, we select the combination {bj , sj} whose efficiency
E∗(η) maximizes U . In the diagram, we also show that the
specific combination {bj , sj} that maximizes U defines well
separated regions of how different strategies can be optimal
for different self-interest and noise levels. Significantly, an
agent will choose to be partisan if Ij > 2/3, regardless of the
value of η.
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